A lot of materialists will admit that there are some kinds of entities that are a little more difficult to make sense of within a materialist ontology. For example – propositions. Here’s an argument for immaterialism that I encountered that seems to be aimed at materialists who would accept the existence of propositions.

I’ve encountered this argument before, but I recently came across it in a dialogue written by Keith Yandel. I think it’s an interesting argument, so I decided to try and reconstruct it as carefully as I could. Here it is.

An Argument Against Materialism

1. Some propositions are necessarily true.
2. It is possible for there to be a world with no material entities.
3. If (1) and (2), then it is possible for a proposition to be true in a world without material entities.
4. Therefore, it is possible for a proposition to be true in a world without material entities.
5. If it is possible for a proposition to be true in a world without material entities, then propositions are not material entities.
6. Therefore, propositions are not material entities.
7. If propositions are not material entities, then materialism is false.
   ——————————————————————-
8. Therefore, materialism is false.

I’ve got some thoughts on this argument, but I’m going to mull it over for a bit. If anyone cares to comment – the thread is open.

2 Responses to “An Argument Against Materialism”

1. 

   Andrew Cullison

   February 4, 2008 at 2:46 pm

   I’ll start comments on my own post. Here are what I see as the materialist options.

   First Option: Deny that some propositions are necessarily true and reject premise one.

   Second Option: Deny that it is possible to have a world without material entities and reject premise two.

   Third Option: Insist that some propositions are necessarily true and that it’s possible to have a world without material entities, but (somehow) this doesn’t entail that is possible for a proposition to be true in a world without material entities.
   (I’ve got some vague idea as to how this might be worked out, but I’m not sure. I’ll wait on this.)

   Option Four: This is another interesting option. If a materialist could work out a theory of truth for propositions such that it was possible for a proposition to be true in a world without existing in that world, they could reject 5. Bleg: Doesn’t Williamson have some stuff on this?

   I can’t see rejecting premise 7. So I think I’ve outlined the four major options for the materialist.

   Reply
2. 

   Malcolm

   April 30, 2010 at 12:10 am

   This type of argument is ontological and also is a false dilemma.

   Reply