Woot! I just heard from Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. They just accepted a paper I co-authored with Neil Feit titled “When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge”.

Here’s the abstract. I’ll post a penultimate version of the paper when I can.

ABSTRACT
Falsehood can preclude knowledge in many ways. A false proposition cannot be known. A false ground can prevent knowledge of a true proposition, or so we argue, but not every false ground deprives its subject of knowledge. A falsehood that is not a ground for belief can also prevent knowledge of a true proposition. This paper aims to provide a systematic account of just when falsehood precludes knowledge, and hence just when it does not. The paper is presented in large part as an approach to the Gettier problem and a search for an adequate theory of knowledge, but we ultimately arrive at a relatively simple theory that has virtues closely connected with many issues at the heart of contemporary epistemology

p.s. We had a really good experience with PPQ, and we had two great referees. Both gave us great feedback. If you’re one of those two referees and you stumble upon this post – Thank You!

One Response to “When Does Falsehood Preclude Knowledge – Accepted for Publication!”

1. 

   Chris

   April 22, 2011 at 1:43 pm

   Congratulations Andy and Neil!

   Reply