I’m with Brian on this one (he’s the guy with glasses in the video). Particularly his second thought experiment.
Update: The link to the video is here. I took out the embedded video because it automatically plays. Which can be annoying to readers – especially return readers who have already seen the video.
More Nuanced Position: Even if it’s not cheating it has most of the main features that would make cheating wrong. Just like uttering something true that pragmatically implicates a falsehood with the intent to deceive someone might not strictly speaking be lying in the technical sense of the word, but has the same wrong making features that lying has..
Hey Andrew,
I think the case is underdescribed.
Suppose that the robot-hooker is extremely simple. While it looks human, it doesn’t exhibit any of the features which might imply that it is conscious or intelligent. It might as well be an inflatable-hooker. In that case, I don’t think there’s any cheating involved. There’s probably not any sex involved, either. Here is an argument for the claim that it is not cheating:
1. If sex with a simple-robot can be cheating, then simple-robots can act immorally.
2. It is not the case that simple-robots can act immorally.
3. So, it is not the case that sex with a simple-robot can be cheating.
It’s immoral to participate in acts of cheating. But, simple-robots don’t have what it takes to act immorally.
If, on the other hand, the thing is plausibly a case of artificial intelligence, or if it is plausible that it is conscious, then it might well be cheating.
I don’t think the fact that I would be pissed at my girlfriend if I walked in on her having sex with a simple-robot that look like my best friend gives us much reason to think that sex with simple-robots is cheating. I’d be pissed not because she’s cheating, but for the same reason I’d be pissed if she confessed to fantasizing about my best friend. While fantasizing about my best friend might be immoral, it’s not cheating.
“This video is not available in your region.”
Too bad.
The webcomic ‘Bobbins’ (now called ‘Scary Go Round’) considered this problem years ago.
http://bobbins.keenspot.com/d/20010620.html
Justin,
I think the robots are supposed to be very realistic replicas. But in any case, I wonder about your first premise…
1. If sex with a simple-robot can be cheating, then simple-robots can act immorally.
Why think that the robot needs to be capable of acting immorally in order for the sex to be cheating. Isn’t the moral capacities of the cheater what is relevant. For example, suppose a married man has sex with someone, and that person is convinced that the man is single. They are not acting immorally (I presume), but the married man is still cheating. Sure this person has the capacity to act immorally – but it’s difficult for me to see how that mere capacity is relevant.
Regarding your last point – that’s why I went with the more nuanced position at the end. Even if it’s not strictly speaking cheating – it would have some of the same wrong making features that cheating has.
Jonathan,
I sent you a direct link where you can download the flash file. I hope that worked.
I completely agree with Brian in the video. I am doing a research paper on this very topic with that same argument. Most of the students in my class think it is a ridiculous topic; however, they have not seen what I have seen. The world is so close to this issue being reality that I shudder to think what I would do if I caught my husband with a robot.
There might not be any bright line here between cheating and not cheating. Is masturbating while watching a pornographic video cheating? Is fantasizing about, but not acting on, sexual relations other than one’s spouse cheating?
My guess is that most people would think that having relations with a (flesh-and-blood) prostitute is indeed cheating because it crosses a line that fantasies and video-watching do not. I suspect the line that indicates is actual physical contact with another person. Whether a robot can count as a person in the relevant senses here, and thus whether it would or should invoke the same condemnation that the paradigm cases of cheating do, is something that can’t be settled a priori. I think there will have to be actual experience with the relevant cases to see how people react to them, what effects they have on the people concerned, etc. before we’ll know whether they should be considered cheating and thus blameworthy.
Hi Jim,
I guess I just don’t understand why what’s going on inside the head of the robot is relevant to whether or not the act would not have the wrong making features that cheating has.
So, for example suppose Bob had sex with a very, very realistic robot that was indistinguishable from a human being from Bob’s perspective. Suppose Bob justifiably believed that it was a person. It seems like that would be cheating (or at least have the wrong making features of cheating) even if the robot had none of the relevant properties for qualifying as a person.
Have you ever stopped to think that classifying things is a semantic fallacy, and nothing is immoral?
Hi tjc,
I’ve spent a lot of time thinking about the merits of the arguments for moral anti-realism. (e.g. took my secondary exam in ethics. The focused topic was on arguments for moral anti-realism, and we spent a lot of time thinking about the arguments for the conclusion that nothing is immoral.)
Do you have an argument that you wanted me to consider?
I suppose what you’ve listed here could be construed as an argument for anti-realism. But I’m not sure what you mean by saying that “classifying things is a semantic fallacy”
You probably don’t mean that the simple act of categorizing things according to shared properties is a fallacy. After all you’ve classified the act of classifying things as a semantic fallacy. I suspect you mean something a bit more precise than this. Could you elaborate?