In the previous post, I did an intuition check. Thanks to everyone who participated. If you haven’t recorded your intuition, here’s the poll in case you want to record it before you read the argument.
[poll=<3>]
I had the intuition that pleasure states must have temporal duration. Here’s an argument I’ve been kicking around.
The basic idea is that being in a state of pleasure requires being in certain experiential state. But an experiential state is an event, and since events require temporal duration – being in a state of pleasure requires temporal duration. I don’t strongly endorse this argument, but it’s interesting to think about. Let’s lay it numbered-premise form so we can flesh out the weakest links.
The Pleasure Requires Temporal Duration Argument.
- Being in a state of pleasure requires that one be in an experiential state.
- An experiential state is an event.
- If (1) and (2), then when a person is in a state of pleasure, then there is an event that the person is going through.
- Therefore, when a person is in a state of pleasure, then there is an event that the person is going through.
- Events have temporal duration.
- If (4) and (5), then being in a state of pleasure requires temporal duration.
- Therefore, being in a state of pleasure requires temporal duration.
Motivation for Premises
I think most of the premises are intuitively plausible. Here’s a quick breakdown of what I’m thinking.Premise 1 – Seems true and pretty secure to me.
Premise 2 – I’m not sure about. Someone who does more work on philosophy of perception might be able to help out here.
Premise 3 – Seems true.
Premise 4 – Subconclusion
Premise 5 – I bet this is contentious. But I think it’s a pretty mainstream view in the ontology of events that you can’t have timeless events because events involve change (and change requires temporal extent). Someone who does more work on the nature of events could help out here.
Premise 6 – Seems true.
Premise 7 – Conclusion.
As I see it (2) and (5) are the weakest link, but for the moment they seem intuitively plausible to me.
I voted ‘no clear intuition’ yesterday, but since then, I’ve thought about it a bit, and it now seems pretty clear to me that pleasure can be had at a durationless moment. (I have no idea why some people think that intuitions have to be spontaneous and not based on arguments or reasons.)
Here’s an argument:
Take a subject S who has been continually experiencing pleasure for some time interval t0-t1. Every time in that interval is a time such that S is experiencing pleasure at that time. But each particular time is a durationless instant.
As to your argument, I don’t think (6) is true, at least if we’re reading ‘requires’ in a way strong enough to make the argument relevant for the claim that pleasure can be had at a durationless instant.
4. Therefore, when a person is in a state of pleasure, then there is an event that the person is going through.
5. Events have temporal duration.
6. If (4) and (5), then being in a state of pleasure requires temporal duration.
(4) and (5) establish that being in a state of pleasure requires the subject to be going through something with temporal duration. But it can still be true at an instant that one is in a state of pleasure, because it can still be true at an instant that one is going through something with temporal duration (just as it can be true at an instant that one has a particular velocity or acceleration).
Jonathan,
That’s good. I was beginning to have a similar worry about (6). (6) is most plausible when you don’t have the strong sense of requires that you have above.
I like your argument. I’ll have to think more about it.
Yeah, it’s pretty plausible that pleasure is the sort of thing that you can only experience if you’re temporally extended, but that’s weaker than the claim that it is impossible to have pleasure at a durationless moment.
(Consider: you have to be temporally extended to be married, but it can be true at a durationless moment that you are married at that moment.)
When I first started reading your post, I was expecting a slightly different argument. Perhaps this argument is a bit too simple:
7. Every state of pleasure is an experiential state.
8. Every experiential state is an event.
9. Every event is temporally extended.
10. Therefore, every state of pleasure is temporally extended.
I guess I think that (9) is false. It is possible that the universe has a first instant of existence. I guess I think that, in that case, there would be an event which is the first instant of the universe’s existence. That event is, presumably, instantaneous.
I’m late to the party. While I find myself drawn to the claim that pleasure requires temporal duration, I’m somewhat drawn to the following line of argument:
(1) Pleasure could require temporal duration only if pleasure required change.
(2) Pleasure does not require change.
(C) Pleasure does not require temporal duration.
I suppose the challenge to those who don’t like the argument is to explain why pleasure would require change. If it did not require change, why would it require temporal duration?
Obviously I don’t take this to establish much of anything since I’m still somewhat convinced that pain requires temporal duration I confess that I don’t know how to show that the above argument is wrong.