This might be a stronger way to frame the argument for freewill and eternalism incompatibilism. It’s more difficult to dismantle than the argument I presented here.

First let’s do a warm-up exercise. Here’s an argument for Incompatibilism.

An Argument For Incompatibilism

1. If determinism is true, then facts outside of your control entail your actions.
2. If facts outside of your control entail your actions, then you do not have freewill.
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, then you do not have freewill.

This one is just a warm-up exercise. I’m sure we’ve all encountered something like this argument. Now something similar to this argument can be run for eternalism and freewill incompatibilism.

An Argument that Freewill and Eternalism are Incompatible

1. If eternalism is true, then facts outside of your control entail your actions.
2. If facts outside your control entail your actions, then you do not have freewill.
3. Therefore, if eternalism is true, then you do not have freewill.

Motivation for (1)
If eternalism is true, then the universe is supposed to be like a big frozen block that (in some sense) always has and always will exist. One might think that the existence of this big frozen block is something that I could have absolutely no control over. Since my actions are a part of that big frozen block, one might think that the existence of the block entails my actions. So if eternalism is true, then there is something I have no control over (the existence of this block) and it entails my actions.

Motivation for (2)
Whatever motivates this premise in the first argument should motivate it here.

This argument seems a bit better to me than the previous argument. I’ll say something more about it after I’ve thought more. (I haven’t forgotten that I want to say something about the argument against Direct Reference Theory that I posted this morning.)

3 Responses to “Freewill and Eternalism: Part Three”

1. 

   Anonymous

   April 10, 2008 at 11:37 am

   My Friend Neal Tognazzini has written a paper on persistence and moral responsibility. I think that he considers arguments for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and Perdurantism. This is obviously a different topic from the one you are considering here, since your topic is about Free Will and Eternalism. But, I thought that the topics were slightly similar and that you might be interested in looking up Neal’s paper.

   Joshua

   Reply
2. 

   Andrew Cullison

   April 10, 2008 at 2:43 pm

   Thanks. I’ve heard of this paper. It’s not at the top of my to-read list.

   Reply
3. 

   Andrew Cullison

   April 10, 2008 at 2:45 pm

   …I meant “It’s NOW at the top of my to-read list”

   (how’s that for a Freudian-slip?)

   Reply