I’m off to Chicago today for the Central APA. Assuming I have access to the internet, I’ll post about some of the philosophy going on there.
I’m commenting on a paper by Matthew Pianalto called “Moral Realism and Ways of Life.” He discusses an issue that Walter Sinnott-Armstrong raises for moral realism that’s fun to think about. Here’s the abstract for Matthew’s Paper.
Moral Realism and Ways of Life (IV-K)
Matthew Pianalto (University of Arkansas)
This paper examines Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s claim that a person’s commitment to a way of life is a relevant factor in deciding what it is true that the agent ought to do in a moral dilemma. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that his view shows that extreme universal moral realism, which claims that facts about the agent make no contribution to the truth of what an agent ought to do, is false. I use Sinnott-Armstrong’s as a starting point to consider how a different kind of moral realism can account for the relevance of ways of life, and argue that they can be regarded as “realistic factors” in moral deliberation because they are grounded in morally permissible commitments which serve to shape the agent’s perspective on his or her situation, rather then serving as additional reasons the agent weighs in his or her decision.
How was the earthquake?
I didn’t even know about it until I read this comment.