In a previous post I presented an argument from Jubien aimed at direct reference theory that relied on mereological essentialism. Here is the post. Below is the argument again so you don’t have to click away.

Michael Jubien’s Argument Against Direct Reference

1. If Direct Reference theory is true, then ‘Venus’ in ‘Venus could have had different parts’ contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more.
2. If ‘Venus’ in ‘Venus could have had different parts’ contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more, then the sentence ‘Venus could have had different parts’ expresses a falsehood.
3. The sentence ‘Venus could have had different parts’ does not express a falsehood.
4. Therefore, it’s not true that ‘Venus’ in ‘Venus could have had different parts’ contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more.
5. Therefore, Direct Reference theory is not true.

I’ve been thinking about this all week. The comments from the previous post noted two very plausible ways to go. Give up on mereological essentialism, and reject (2). I’m inclined to give up on mereological essentialism too, but I must confess I have my moments where I wake up groggy and ask myself – why should I reject that view again?

The other option suggested was to give up on (3). If you’re a mereological essentialist, why not stick to those guns and say that Venus couldn’t have had different parts?

Let’s pursue this option of rejecting (3) a little further. I think if you’re a mereological essentialist, you’re going to have a tough time finding a plausible semantic theory that allows you to keep (3).

Jubien takes it for granted that his descriptivism would allow us to keep (3). But consider the sentence.

(V) Venus could have had different parts.

It seems that Jubien’s version of descriptivism entails that (V) is synonymous with (V*)

(V*) There is an X such that X has the property being-Venus and X could have had different parts.

(V*) is false if you’re a mereological essentialist. If you’re a mereological essentialist and a standard descriptivist then you’d have to say that (V) doesn’t express a truth. It seems like Jubien would have to reject (3) in his own argument. Or make it more clear how his version of descriptivism when combined with mereological essentialism doesn’t entail that (V) is false.

2 Responses to “An Objection to Direct Reference Theory: Part II”

1. 

   Anonymous

   April 16, 2008 at 9:23 pm

   Hey Andrew,

   Doesn’t Jubien deny that (V) entails (V*)?

   At any rate, Jubien will think that the following expresses a truth:

   (V**) There is an x such that x has the property of being Venus and, possibly, there is a y such that y has the property of being Venus and x and y have different parts.

   Or, where p1…. pn are actually Venus’ parts,

   (V***) Possibly, there is an x such that x has the property of being Venus and it is not the case that p1…. pn are parts of x.

   Reply
2. 

   www.andrewcullison.com/widescope

   April 16, 2008 at 10:32 pm

   Hi Anonymous,

   This is great! It pre-empted my third post.

   Jubien may say something that would indicate that (V) is not synonymous with (V*) elsewhere. The only clue Jubien seems to give regarding his semantic theory in the paper I was discussing seemed to imply that (V) was synonymous with (V*)…

   My next post was about to say that this may be uncharitable. A more charitable interpretation might be that (V) is synonymous with your (V**)

   But I was going to add…if that’s Jubien’s theory, then the direct reference theory might have this translation of (V) available

   (V***) Venus is such that there is another object that could have instantiated all of the same intrinsic properties that Venus instantiates.

   The Millian (who was committed to mereological essentialism could offer (V***) as the appropriate translation of (V) which mirrors the move Jubien makes to offer a descriptivist translation of (V).

   Thanks for the comment.

   Reply