This seems like a very quick and hasty objection to direct reference theory from Michael Jubien, but it’s interesting. Direct Reference Theory recall is the thesis that the meaning of a name is the thing to which it refers (and nothing more).
From the present perspective [direct reference] cannot be right. It is an indisputable modal fact that (the planet) Venus could have had some different parts. If the name ‘Venus’ simply contributed a physical object to the claims expressed with the help of that name, it would follow that some physical object could have had different parts. But we have apparently just seen that no physical object could have different parts. And all we needed to see it was a seemingly innocent and naturalistic conception of physical stuff. The falsity of direct reference theory is a very important consequence of these seemingly innocent and straightforward metaphysical considerations. (Michael Jubien. 2007. “Analyzing Modality” in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3: pp. 116-117)
Wow. So some kind of mereological essentialism leads to the denial of Millianism? Let’s grant Jubien the consequences of his thought experiment and assume that no physical object could have different parts. I may lay that out in a future post soon, but for now I’ll leave it as homework.
Michael Jubien’s Argument Against Direct Reference
- If Direct Reference theory is true, then ‘Venus’ in ‘Venus could have had different parts’ contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more.
- If ‘Venus’ in ‘Venus could have had different parts’ contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more, then the sentence ‘Venus could have had different parts’ expresses a falsehood.
- The sentence ‘Venus could have had different parts’ does not express a falsehood.
- Therefore, it’s not true that ‘Venus’ in ‘Venus could have had different parts’ contributes a physical object to the proposition expressed and nothing more.
- Therefore, Direct Reference theory is not true.
That’s my summary of the argument. Let me know if you think I’m being uncharitable. I’ve got a lot to say about this argument. This may involve laying out Jubien’s thought experiment that alleges to show that physical objects could not have had different parts. This will all have to wait. I have to get to school.
So, here’s my stubborn sort of reply that will not be very satisfying.
I’m more convinced of the truth of direct reference than I am of the truth of mereological essentialism. So, if this argument goes through, it just gives me a reason to reject mereological essentialism. How’s that for a Moorean switch? (I think that’s the term)
Of course, if Jubien has some awesome arguments leading to the conclusion that mereological essentialism is true, I would reconsider.
I’m inclined to think that Millians who accept mereological essentialism should deny premise (3). Of course, I think a better response is to reject mereological essentialism and deny premise (2).
I agree on both counts. Thanks for both of these posts. I wanted to say something similar on both fronts.
I’ve got some other concerns about the argument that I’ll post about in a bit. Basically, I think if the Millian/Mereological Essentialist has to give up on the claim that Venus could have had different parts, then so will an essentialist who endorses Jubien’s semantic theory.