Here is the puzzle…
Suppose that Karen, a 14-year old girl, decides to conceive a child. Having a child at such a young age will make life very hard for Karen, and for her child as well: in general, Karen will have a much better life if she delays having a child for another 10 years or so; and the child whom she would have 10 years later would also have a much better life than any child whom she conceives today. So we might accept the statement that she ought not to have a child at her age.
But then Karen’s child is born; she names him Max. Max is now a member of the community, and we are committed to treating him with concern and respect. So we are now most reluctant to accept the statement that Max ought not to have been brought into existence. But we know that if Karen had not had a child at the age of 14, Max would not have been brought into existence.
If you accept all of the ought-judgements above, it seems like you’re committed to a contradiction. Ralph has an interesting (and complex) solution to the problem, but I wonder why we shouldn’t just give up on the principle of necessity of origin. That’s the principle being assumed in the last sentence of the the passage above.
“We are so clever with words,” Krishnamurti once said, “We think that by offering explanations we have solved the problem.”
Doesn’t this puzzle typify the baselessness of so much contemporary philosophy? We can strike the whole thing.
First it asks us to compare hypotheticals: Assume that nonexistent child A has a harder life than nonexistent child B; Immediately we’re talking about things which are not only unknown, but arguably unknowable due to their mutual exclusivity. Even if that were not the case, however, the facts in question are purely subjective. These are statements that cannot be meaningfully evaluated for real people, let alone imaginary ones. Is my life harder than yours? According to who, and by what metric? It’s nonsense, isn’t it?
Additionally, we’re being asked to evaluate whether a person would be better off having not been born, which is just as nonsensical. A person who has not been born is not a person at all; his existence can’t be compared to non-existence. Being born cannot be preferable to its alternative, because the latter state is such that no preference can exist at all.
Beyond those somewhat pedantic issues, there is the larger question of establishing obligation in the first place. You’ve prefaced the issue by saying, “if you accept all of the ought-judgements above…” but the most logical response is to not do that. After all, there’s been no reason given for such judgement. Even in the original wording, it’s left very iffish: “we might accept the statement that she ought not to have a child at her age,” he says.
But why would we accept such an authoritarian judgment? What obligates Karen to alter her decisions? Because we’d like her to? Like so many philosophical questions, this one asks its reader to evaluate the situation, not with empiricism and science, but with intuition and culture. It’s enough, I think, to simply state the facts at hand, without attempting the impossible task of establishing an obligation. We may believe (though we cannot possibly know this) that one future event will cause less suffering than another; but that is all. All we have is our belief. Anything beyond that, any invocation of ought, is pure metaphysics; it has no basis in fact. Wanting to convert opinion into certainty is not enough to make it so.
Hi Stewart,
Thanks for the comments. There’s a lot in here. So, let me begin with a general point.
It looks like you’re trying to argue that we should stop messing around with contemporary philosophy and stick to empirical scientific methods.
The problem is – to really flesh out an argument like this, we’re going to need to make some substantive philosophical claims – in short, we’d be doing philosophy. Also, it’s not clear we’ll be able to escape relying on intuitions somewhere in the argument.
Here’s an example. Consider your claim that “Philosophy is baseless”
I’m a little unclear on what you mean by ‘baseless’, but I suspect you have a problem with the grounds that are used to make philosophical arguments/claims – Is that right? Based on what you say later, I assume part of the reason you think philosophy is baseless is because it seems to rely on non-empirical grounds.
But now we need a theory of grounds or evidence, something of the following form…
X is adequate grounds for P iff (fill in the blank)
It’s difficult to see how we’re going to fill in the blank without relying on some kind of intuition.
Here’s another example…
You claim that the most logical response is to not accept the above ought judgments. Your reason was the no reason was given.
Your epistemic principle then is something like…
(A) If no reason has been given for P, then the most logical response is not to accept P.
What empirical grounds do we have for that?
Suppose I replied that the reasons were that the ought judgments were intuitive.
You would say that’s not a reason. You would then be endorsing the following general principle.
(B) Intuitions are not good reasons.
Again, what would the grounds for (B) be? Probably intuitions.
We could try to get into scientific grounds for accepting (A) and (B) presumably through induction or inference to the best explanatory hypothesis, but I suspect this will only push the problem back when we ask what our grounds are for accepting those methods of reasoning.
Hi Andrew,
Sorry if my earlier comment seemed combative. I re-read it, and I think it probably did, though that wasn’t really my intent.
I’m not suggesting that all contemporary philosophy is baseless; just that this puzzle is a good example of the sort which is. And by “baseless” I mean that it makes assertions which are backed solely by intuition, and which can’t plausibly be verified physically. With respect to your objections, I understand that my accusation of baselessness may, itself, be an unprovable statement. I’m okay with that.
That is to say, I’m not trying to flesh this out as an epistemological truth. If I say that your belief in P is unprovable, you may retort that my belief about your belief in P is also unprovable. You wouldn’t suppose that this is an argument in favor of P, though, nor that my statement was necessarily incorrect. I think you’d agree that this line of thinking is turtles all the way down. It seems to me, however, that arguments in favor of normative ethics are saying, “No really, this is the last turtle!”
In Karen’s example we suppose that, given certain interpretive facts about her sons’ hypothetical lives, Karen has an obligation to act in one way or another. Were we to have slightly different opinions about her children’s lives, however, we might believe the obligation to be a different one–even the opposite one. Or if we had a different opinion of what it meant for an action to be moral, or preferred, we could similarly come up with different conclusions.
But what is the nature of this obligation? Is she compelled by an unseen force to act in some manner? No, clearly not. Is there anything physically different about her, or her environment, which would indicate the presence of such an obligation? Again, no. The obligation does not meaningfully exist. And whether we believe it exists has–attempts to persuade her aside–no bearing on Karen or her behavior.
Why do we spend so much time trying to prove the objective reality of something which, quite clearly, does not exist anywhere outside of our individual minds? It seems that the only purpose is so that we can say to the Karens of the world, “You’re not supposed to do that. And see? I’ve proven it.” Which, of course, we have not.
Hi Stewart,
We’re used to combat. Check this out
So…no worries about the combat nature of the comments.
Regarding the following paragraph…
With respect to your objections, I understand that my accusation of baselessness may, itself, be an unprovable statement. I’m okay with that.
That is to say, I’m not trying to flesh this out as an epistemological truth. If I say that your belief in P is unprovable, you may retort that my belief about your belief in P is also unprovable. You wouldn’t suppose that this is an argument in favor of P, though, nor that my statement was necessarily incorrect.
I wasn’t assuming that because your statement was unprovable that this proved some proposition. I was assuming something like the following…
Some philosophers rely on intuitions as a ground for belief. That seems perfectly acceptable, indeed, inescapable. The only way to deny it would be to rely on intuitions.
Indeed it seems that the only way to have any reasonable beliefs about what are the proper grounds for belief, we’d have to rely on intuitions.
And now the point…if we rely on intuitions concerning what are and are not appropriate grounds for belief – it seems that it should also be appropriate to rely on intuitions to ground other normative claims (e.g., moral claims)
At a minimum that seems like some good reason to allow for the possibility that moral intuitions could ground moral claims. The point is we use intuitions to ground all sorts of claims. Why think that there is anything especially problematic when it comes to moral claims?
I don’t disagree with your statement about how intuition forms our beliefs, but it seems that your position converts opinion into fact without any explanation except, “it’s intuitive”. If all of our beliefs are grounded solely by intuitions, then how are they grounded at all?
If I understand you correctly, you’re arguing that–as there is no other apparent means to evaluate moral statements–intuition is acceptable as a method for evaluating them. But other statements are typically evaluated using the addition of physical evidence. Even if our intuition is ultimately the method for evaluating the evidence, at least there is something physical being investigated. Moral philosophy is unlike any other field I’m aware of, in that participants can make a claim about something imaginary, and test their hypothesis solely by how it feels to them.
Regarding…
I don’t disagree with your statement about how intuition forms our beliefs, but it seems that your position converts opinion into fact without any explanation except, “it’s intuitive”.
I don’t understand what it would be for a position to “convert opinion into fact” – so I can’t assess the claim that my view does that. Nor could I assess whether it does do that. Furthermore, I don’t know that I could assess whether it was a reason to think my position is false.
Here’s your argument as I see is roughly as follows:
Call the view you’re labeling my view intuitionism.
(1) Intuitionism turns opinion into fact without any explanation except that it’s intuitive.
(2) If intuitionism turns opinion into fact without any explanation except that it’s intuitive, then intuitionism is false.
(C) Therefore, intuitionism is false.
Is that your argument? If so I need to know what ‘turns opinion into fact’ means.
Regarding this
Even if our intuition is ultimately the method for evaluating the evidence, at least there is something physical being investigated…
What is meant by physical being is a little unclear, but I assume you mean entities that are naturalistically respectable. Compatible with our best physics, or something like that…Assuming that’s what is meant, then whether your claim assumes that moral properties couldn’t be natural property. And that moral properties are not instantiated by natural events. That assumption is highly contentious.
Regarding this…
Moral philosophy is unlike any other field I’m aware of, in that participants can make a claim about something imaginary, and test their hypothesis solely by how it feels to them.
First, it’s unclear that moral philosophy makes claims about imaginary stuff. I thought we were arguing about whether or not it was plausible to think that…this just assumes it.
Second, one good candidate explanation for why moral philosophy is the only discipline you’re aware of that tests hypothesis on the basis of intuitions is because the other disciplines simply take some things for granted that should be tested, but are not tested. One could hold th moral philosophy unlike the other disciplines tests even the fundamental background assumptions.
It’s pretty easy for a discipline to not test hypothesis based on intuition, by simply assuming that the hypothesis and true and not testing it at all.
Third, I doubt it’s true that NO other discipline relies entirely or mostly on intuitions. How we carve up disciplines will be pretty arbitrary to begin with, so I’m not quite sure how to assess the claim.
I could have written “represents opinion as fact” rather than “converts”. That would have had a clearer meaning, I think. Also, I didn’t write “physical being” as a noun, such as “a physical being”; rather, I wrote “something physical being investigated”, as in “a thing which is physical, and which is also being investigated”. Probably that caused some confusion.
To return to the original question, though: I don’t understand how Karen’s supposed obligation (apart from the obvious fact that it’s a hypothetical) is anything other than imaginary. I’m not, as you seem to suggest, arguing whether it’s plausible or not to think such moral statements are imaginary–I’m not interested in trying to prove such a thing, and I doubt it would be possible. Additionally, I don’t mean to insult you or your work in moral philosophy, by using the I-word. When I say that the obligation is imaginary I only mean that it exists as thought, and not independently. As there is no empirical evidence for the obligation which I can conceive of, and as its evaluation can (and surely does) vary by observer, I don’t see how it could be viewed otherwise.
I believe it follows, then, that I would not accept the relevant ought-judgements as having any authority over Karen’s actions, and the rest of the puzzle would no longer hold any contradiction.
Regarding…
could have written “represents opinion as fact” rather than “converts”. That would have had a clearer meaning, I think.
I also could have been clearer. My issue was more with the opinion/fact distinction. I can think of at least four different things that people mean when they say “X is an opinion and not a fact”
Regarding the physical being stuff. I went back and read your post. I read “something” as “some” I see now what you meant, but the point is actually the same. If you say that moral properties are not something physical, (and physical just means – compatible with our best physical theory) you’re making a highly contentious assumption.
(For example, act utilitarianism is a very popular moral theory (forget about whether it’s plausible or not), but act utilitarianism holds that moral rightness/wrongness reduces to pleasure outcomes. There’s nothing spooky or non-physical about pleasure or actions yielding more or less pleasure than others. Many normative moral theories purport to reduce moral properties to properties that are perfectly respectable naturalistic or physical properties.)
Regarding…
When I say that the obligation is imaginary I only mean that it exists as thought, and not independently. As there is no empirical evidence for the obligation which I can conceive of, and as its evaluation can (and surely does) vary by observer, I don’t see how it could be viewed otherwise.
Quick question:
Is this the principle you have in mind?
(P) If there is no empirical evidence for X and evaluations of whether or not X obtains can vary by observer, then X is imaginary
(…or at a minimum X should be regarded as imaginary)
(Aside: I’m not insulted. You’re not saying things that are terribly different from what some moral philosophers might say…so it’s difficult to construe these as putting down moral philosophy. If your comments are putting anything down, they are putting down a robust form of moral realism – But lots of philosophers put that down.)
Take your example of utilitarianism: In such a theory, what physically corresponds to obligation? We might talk about “good” or “moral” actions being those which increase pleasure, and we might further reduce those pleasures to their biological components–certainly that would be physical. But what would it have to do with obligation? We have only put forward a definition for those words, but they have no intrinsic authority. Contentious or not, I see no evidence that such a moral property, other than its neurological representation, could be a physical entity.
I don’t have a principle in mind when I use the word “imaginary”. At least, not more-so than other common words. I have an intended meaning, of course, and perhaps you’d consider that the same thing. As I wrote earlier, I’m referring to things which do not exist independent of thought. To date I have observed no evidence–nor can I conceive of any–which would indicate that this is not the case for obligations, thus I consider obligations to be imaginary. However, I wouldn’t say that one should believe obligations to be imaginary, since such a statement would plainly be incoherent, and is exactly the sort of normative statement that I’m advising against.
Beyond the fact that a great many people believe that obligations exist in some form or another, and that there is no apparent way to logically prove their physical non-existence, can you provide some evidence for why Karen ought to act in one way or another? It seems that the puzzle would be sort of pointless without any.
Hi Stewart,
thanks for all of these comments.
Regarding,
But what would it have to do with obligation? We have only put forward a definition for those words, but they have no intrinsic authority.
Being such that it maximizes utility would be what it is to be obligatory (if utilitarianism were true). I’m not what you mean by instrinsic authority, but one way that utilitarians get to utilitarianism is to note is to cite several instances of obligation, and note that whenever we have an obvious case of obligation it seems to also be an obvious case of utility maximization.
Which leads to your second point. Why think that there are obligations at all?
Your last paragraph seems to indicate that the only evidence I have for obligations is the fact that people believe in them and there is no logical way to prove their non-existence. That was never the claim.
First, intuitions are distinct from beliefs. I am inclined to regard intuitions as a form of evidence for a proposition – defeasible evidence.
I then tried to briefly make the case regarding intuitions as a kind of evidence. The main idea is that intuitions are going to be at the foundation of any discipline.
The scientist, for example, is going to have to rely on intuitions as evidence for the foundational principles of scientific reasoning.
The person who wants to claim that intuitions are not evidence is going to have to consult some intuitions about what counts as evidence, what doesn’t count as evidence, and have a theory of evidence (all of which would be supported by intuition).
The claim that there are moral obligations, is supported by intuitions about particular cases (and the absence of strong defeaters to the contrary).
This doesn’t mean that every time someone has an intuition that they should believe the moral proposition. Intuitions would be some evidence in favor of the propostion; however, depending one’s total evidence in a given situation that intuition may be outweighed by other considerations.
This sort of stuff happens with perception all the time. Perceptions count as some evidence for a proposition, but that evidence can be outweighed in a particular case.
Hi Andrew,
My last paragraph wasn’t meant to suggest that you only believed in obligations because so many other people do, but rather it was directed at your comment about my position being contentious.
I understand now what you mean about intuition being a form of tentative evidence. Thank you for clarifying that. It makes perfect sense to me, and appears to account very nicely for why someone would believe a given proposition. I still do not understand how you are accounting for obligations, however.
In your example of utilitarianism, you wrote:
“Being such that it maximizes utility would be what it is to be obligatory … [O]ne way that utilitarians get to utilitarianism is to cite several instances of obligation, and note that whenever we have an obvious case of obligation it seems to also be an obvious case of utility maximization.”
As a definition for what is obligatory, I will gladly accept “what maximizes utility.” Or anything else, for that matter. Definitions do not establish authority, though. Why should one do what is supposed to be an obligation? Are we forced to by an outside power? No. Are we compelled to by our own minds? Again, no. One may as well say that it “maximizes utility”–if that is the meaning–and leave the words “obligation” and “ought” out of the picture. They do not add anything, apart from emotional impact, which is extrinsic authority. Intrinsically there is no “why”.
We can suppose that the young Karen’s child will suffer more (for some agreed meaning of ‘suffering’) than the alternate child. We might further say that it is unethical to cause avoidable suffering. We can then say, with little room for argument, that it is unethical for Karen to bear the first child instead of the alternate. But this is just tautological gymnastics–an arrangement of symbols. The only reason we would pay special attention to it is because of the emotional connotation that words such as “unethical” or “immoral” have for most of us.
This is what I meant early by there being no intrinsic authority. The authority comes from our emotional connections to the words, not from the definitions themselves. Of course, it may very well be the case that we prefer to avoid unnecessary suffering anyway. But if that is our preference, we may as well be clear about it being a personal one, and not an objective attribute. That is, when we say that an event is immoral we are not saying anything about the event, but rather we are saying something about ourselves, and how we feel about the event. It is, in the emotivist sense, as if we were saying “Boo suffering!”