This is pretty half-baked, but consider the following proposition:

(1) January 9, 2008 is present.

I think it is a vague matter whether or not this is true. Imagine the minutes are slowly ticking away on January 8. It’s 11:59. As the time passes, January 9 will be determinately present, but exactly when that happens seems to be a vague matter.

This, however, will lend some support to A-Theory (and either presentism or some version of the moving spotlight view in the ontology of time). For imagine if B-Theory is true. If B-Theory is true, then ‘present’ functions like an indexical, and (1) really expresses something like the following proposition.

(1*) October 4, 2006 is October 4, 2006.

(1*) is not vague. At least many philosophers are inclined to accept that identity statements are not vague, and whatever motivates us to accept that should motivate us to accept that (1*) is not vague.

4 Responses to “A-Theory and Vagueness”

1. 

   Justin

   January 10, 2008 at 12:53 am

   Is this what you have in mind? To separate January 8 from January 9, we have to pick some (instantaneous) dividing line. Times to the “left” are determinately Jan 8, to the right are determinately Jan 9. Do we have to worry about right on the dividing line? It seems that we do, since it has to be picked at some instant, say t0. (This is assuming time is continuous rather than discrete.) So, the truth value of (1) is vague when (1) is uttered at t0.

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2. 

   Andrew Cullison

   January 10, 2008 at 10:26 am

   That is sort of what I had in mind. It does assume that time in continuous.

   In fact, that’s the first way for the eternalist/B-theorist to resist. They could say that time is discrete, there is a precise moment at which January 9 becomes present, and so (1) is not vague.

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3. 

   Neilio

   January 14, 2008 at 5:08 pm

   Isn’t (1) an identity statement too, so that whatever reasons there are for non-vague identity statements, they affect (1) as well as (1*). If (1) isn’t an identity statement, switch “present” for “the present time” and the result is surely an identity statement.

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4. 

   Andrew Cullison

   January 14, 2008 at 5:25 pm

   Hey Neilio,

   I think you’re right. (1) is an identity statement. I think that because I lean toward B-Theory/Eternalism.

   I was thinking that an A-Theorist might take these vagueness considerations as some prima facie reason to think that (1) is not an identity statement.

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